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Feature Essay
Fall 2008
Childers, Christopher “Old Buck" and the Political Crisis of the 1850s.
James Buchanan has never enjoyed a good reputation among historians and
president-raters; most people rate his presidency at or near the worst in American
history. Yet even as students of the 1850s note his shortcomings, many—if not
most—of the scholars of this period qualify their answer. For James
Buchanan—the “Old Public Functionary"—possessed perhaps the most
experience of any president in our history. Buchanan’s résumé reveals a man
immersed in the American political system. Congressman, senator, minister to
the Court of St. James, minister to Russia, secretary of state; Buchanan held all
these positions in a political career that spanned from the 1820s to the
commencement of the Civil War. By almost any measure, James Buchanan had
sterling credentials for the office of president.
Some of America’s most prominent historians have exhibited
ambivalence—at best—about the 15th president. More often, Old Buck has
faced withering criticism. For example, Kenneth M. Stampp addressed Buchanan
in two of his books: And the War Came (1950) and America in 1857: A Nation
on the Brink (1990). One of the northern Democrats’ most sympathetic
historians, Roy F. Nichols, lauded Stampp for taking a “sensible view" of
Buchanan, “making him neither the villain nor the constitutional saint." Forty
years later, however, even Stampp penned a scathing portrait of Buchanan. In the
1950s and 1960s, historians like Nichols concerned themselves with offering a
fair assessment of the “Old Public Functionary." Philip Shriver Klein’s 1962
biography of Buchanan embodies this principle; nearly all its reviewers
commented on the fair and impartial approach (in their estimation) of the book.
Klein offers the most sympathetic treatment of the 15th president. However,
Stampp’s latter portrait better characterizes the typical approach of recent
Buchanan historiography. Certainly Jean Baker’s recent portrayal of Buchanan
fits this view.
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Last month, a panel of distinguished historians gathered in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania, James Buchanan’s hometown, to participate in a symposium on
the man and the crises he faced during his presidency. On the symposium’s first
night, participants assembled on the grounds of Buchanan’s home, Wheatland,
for a discussion between two of the greatest historians of the 1850s—Michael F.
Holt and William Freehling.
Interestingly, the majority of the questions that Holt and Freehling fielded
concerned counterfactuals—the great “What Ifs?" of history. What if Buchanan
had stuck with his earlier advocacy of extending the Missouri Compromise line
rather than endorsing the Kansas-Nebraska Act? What if Buchanan had asserted
national authority in the Kansas imbroglio? What if Buchanan had taken a
stronger posture in the secession crisis? The Buchanan presidency seems to
provoke many “what if" questions from people who cannot escape the
conclusion that many things went terribly wrong between the years of 1857 and
1861.
The next day, the symposium shifted to Franklin & Marshall College, where
Buchanan served as president of the board of trustees from 1852 to 1866. Old
Buck certainly had a few sympathizers in the crowd; one man rose at the end of
the last session to praise Buchanan, especially given the fact that he has endured
ceaseless criticism for 150 years. Few historical figures have endured such
scrutiny and disdain, the man argued. And yet, even the most ardent Buchanan
supporters—from the Lancaster community and elsewhere—eventually concede
that the president’s record certainly does not merit praise. Of course, many of the
panelists grappled with this very question. Buchanan biographer (and
symposium participant) Jean Baker has phrased the dilemma well, asking “why
such a well-trained and well-intentioned public figure could have failed so
abominably"?
Most all of the panelists agreed: James Buchanan’s was a failed presidency.
And when someone spoke of his strengths, they surely did not speak of the
sectional crisis. John Belohlavek spoke positively of Buchanan’s skill at
managing foreign policy, while William B. MacKinnon praised his decisive
efforts at ending the Mormon crisis in Utah. But a strong foreign policy aimed at
territorial expansion and the tamping down of rebellion in Utah did not assuage
most of the scholars at this symposium, who generally viewed Old Buck’s
presidency harshly. Indeed, while other panelists conceded Belohlavek’s point,
they noted that Buchanan tended to flee domestic crises by attending to foreign
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affairs.
In all fairness, and in spite of Buchanan’s obvious shortcomings, most of the
historians agreed that Buchanan inherited a terrible situation. As Nicole
Etcheson pointed out, the crisis in Kansas had already spun out of control as
proslavery and antislavery settlers in the territory made a mockery of Stephen
Douglas’s popular sovereignty doctrine. And as Holt and Freehling—two grey
giants of the field—ably discussed, the great party system that had given form
and organization to political conflict was in disarray. A sectional party had risen
from the ashes of the Whig Party and the short-lived Know Nothings to
challenge the Democrats. And while the feckless Republican candidate John C.
Fremont lost his bid for the presidency in 1856, the specter of a sectional party
hostile to southern interests threatened political stability and provoked bitter
recriminations from southern Democrats and northern doughfaces.
Amidst this turmoil, James Buchanan won the presidency. Yet the scholars
at Lancaster generally agreed that Buchanan made a bad situation worse. As
Maury Klein noted, Buchanan picked an ineffective cabinet. Secretary of State
Lewis Cass had long passed his prime and served as a mere figurehead; John B.
Floyd, the Secretary of War, appeared downright crooked, especially after a
congressional investigation severely tarnished the Buchanan administration’s
image. At the outset of his presidency, Buchanan had tried to craft a sectionally
balanced Cabinet and in the end created a mess. Perhaps more notably,
Buchanan’s meddling in the Dred Scott case created a firestorm in the North at
the very beginning of his presidency. The president’s statement that he would
“cheerfully submit" to the Supreme Court’s decision in the case followed a brief
conference between Buchanan and Chief Justice Roger B. Taney moments
before he took the oath of office. But this paled in comparison to allegations that
Buchanan had personally encouraged his friend Justice Robert C. Grier to vote
with the majority and deny Scott’s plea. Legal historian Paul Finkelman
presented a compelling argument that Buchanan’s early actions immediately
handicapped his administration.
By 1860, old battles over Kansas, the Dred Scott decision, and internecine
struggles within the Democratic Party had weakened the American political
establishment and had rendered the Buchanan administration ineffective. When
Abraham Lincoln won election to the presidency in November 1860, without a
single electoral vote from the South, a crisis had finally emerged that
compromise would not avert. But Buchanan faced his own crisis, in what Jean
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Baker has called his “extraordinary contradiction" that while Buchanan believed
the Union inviolable, “he held no coercive power to prevent or overturn an
illegal act by a state." Buchanan’s belief that he possessed no power to maintain
the Union paralyzed his administration and seemingly limited him to a
wait-and-see approach, hoping that calmer heads would prevail and the crisis
would pass. Jean Baker, Daniel Crofts, and Michael Holt discussed Buchanan’s
actions in the secession crisis, a course that strongly favored the South.
Buchanan seemed increasingly impotent in addressing the issues that the crisis
posed and even acquiescent in the course of secession, to the point where he
prepared to order Major Robert Anderson from Fort Sumter back to the scuttled
Fort Moultrie, a move that essentially surrendered the federal installations in
South Carolina. Only when three of Buchanan’s cabinet members threatened
resignation did Buchanan change his course and take a more Unionist stance. In
many respects, Buchanan seemed all too willing to leave the crisis for Lincoln to
manage.
Buchanan left the presidency in disgrace, and ever since historians have
damned his administration for its ineptitude and ineffectiveness. Why then hold a
symposium on the fifteenth president? In contrast, we certainly will not see
symposiums on Warren G. Harding—the runner-up to Buchanan as America’s
worst president in a recent U.S. News survey—any time soon! Each historian at
this conference answered this question definitively. While the Buchanan
presidency surely failed, no one can doubt the import of his presidential years.
He presided over a nation in turmoil, on the brink of the most celebrated and
well-studied event in U.S. history, the Civil War. Yet as more than one scholar at
this symposium argued, Buchanan was the wrong president at the wrong time.
Sterling credentials aside, Buchanan lacked the ability to deal with the issues he
faced. That makes his presidency a failure, but it makes study of the presidency
of James Buchanan essential.
Christopher Childers is the editor of Civil War Book Review.
This column also appears in a longer format in the journal Common-Place.
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